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FROM LOGAN VALLEY PLAZA TO HYDE PARK AND BACK:
SHOPPING CENTERS AND FREE SPEECH
by M. Russell Kruse, Jr.
Rapid commercial development and evolving constitutional concepts have
modified property rights at an unaccustomed rate. With our nation's ongoing
flight from city to suburb,1 the necessity and utility of locating large, privately-
owned shopping centers outside the downtown areas have become obvious. The
development of these shopping areas has revealed many legal problems,' not
the least important of which is the constitutional free speech guaranty of the
first and fourteenth amendments. The shopping center provides an excellent
arena in which to focus the conflict between the rights of private property
ownership and the rights of free speech. This Comment will first examine
traditional and fundamental property notions and then explore the constitu-
tional impact of free speech upon those notions.
The population movement away from the inner city in the post-World War
II era has been the single most important factor in the success of shopping
centers.! With this population shift there was the following evolution:
First came the 'neighborhood center,' a strip of small shops usually anchored
by a supermarket. Then came the Slightly larger 'community center,' which in-
cluded a discount store, [or] junior department store .... Then in the mid-
1950's came the earliest 'regional centers' anchored by one or two department
stores and surrounded by a sea of parking. This was closely followed by the
climate-controlled mall.'
While the size of the center may vary,' its success in American retailing cannot
be questioned.'
Ninety percent of these shopping complexes are neighborhood or community
centers,' but downtown shopping centers are also being developed in con-
junction with urban renewal.8 The growth of this retail trend should correspond
to the increase in the population movement. Accordingly, the International
Council of Shopping Centers claims that $6 billion annually will be necessary
'See generally Roberts, The Demise of Property Law, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1971).
'For example, zoning conflicts have arisen as a result of growing pressure by environ-
mentalists against further commercial alteration of the landscape. Zoning boards have also
been tough because of the problems caused by the huge influx of automobile traffic, as well
as neighboring residential complaints. Another problem is leasing arrangements which give
larger stores a veto power over other tenants' leases. The Federal Trade Commission has
investigated the practice as an unfair competition device to keep discount stores out. BUsI-
NESS WEEK, Sept. 4, 1971, at 37, 38.
'Weiss, Expect 1000 Pedestrian Shopping Malls by 1980, 41 ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 21,
1970, at 50.
4 BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 4, 1971, at 36.
' The Urban Land Institute categorizes shopping centers as follows: (1) neighborhood
center, 30,000-100,000 square feet, serving 5,000-40,000 people; (2) community center,
100,000-300,000 square feet, serving 40,000-150,000 people; (3) regional center, 300,000-
1,000,000 square feet, serving 150,000-400,000 people. 105 SALES MANAGEMENT, Nov. 1,
1970, at 34.
'The International Council of Shopping Centers estimated that in 1969 some 12,000
centers with over 200,000 stores did $99.5 billion of business, which is 38% of the top
300 metropolitan markets. Id. A later article cites a figure in excess of 40% of all retail
sales excluding cars and building materials. 47 CHAIN STORE AGE, Feb. 1971, at 25.
747 CHAIN STORE AGE, Feb. 1971, at 25.
8 BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 4, 1971, at 36.
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over the next fifteen years for the development of 12,000 additional shopping
centers.
I. PROPERTY CONCEPTS
One does not sell the earth upon which the people walk."
This statement reflects a concept known as the law of the commons." The
underlying premise is that "common areas" are not owned by individuals but
simply used by a community of people with equal access. Total freedom in the
commons is quite possible with a limited population. But, as the common area
diminishes, total freedom in the commons leads to what has been called the
"tragedy of the commons."" The conflict between public utility and personal
utility will eventually lead to ruin for all if left unchecked by controls. 3 The
fact that certain rules and controls have developed into the concept of property
ownership is attributable mainly to this phenomenon.' Thomas Aquinas rea-
soned that the concept of private property with its myriad of societal rules
came into existence because of man's fall from a state of innocence." Judging
from the primacy with which most Americans view private property rights,
the fall was a long one.
America inherited the common-law property concepts of estates in land from
England."6 Also inherited was the right of escheat, which maintains a basic
'These figures are based on a projected population increase of 40 million by the year
1985. Fifty percent of that figure will be in the suburbs. 47 CHAIN STORE AGE, Feb. 1971,
at 25.
"
0 This simple but eloquent concept was enunciated by Sitting Bull upon learning that
Chief Red Cloud, out of desperation and hopelessness, planned to sell their Black Hills
hunting ground to the federal government. J. GUINN, THE RED MAN'S LAST STRUGGLE
12 (1966).
"See, e.g., Lloyd, The Checks to Population, in POPULATION, EVOLUTION, AND BIRTH
CONTROL 37 (G. Hardin ed. 1964).
"Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK 31
(G. De Bell ed. 1970).
" The most common example of this phenomenon is the ruin of grazing land by herds-
men who will naturally pursue a limited personal utility by increasing their own herd in-
stead of controlling the herd's numbers for the total or public utility. Id. at 37.
'" The concept that property is merely a state of mind without guidelines to delineate
ownership was illustrated by philosopher Jeremy Bentham. According to this theory, no
savage or animal can experience ownership of property because they lack the proper state
of mind. "The savage who has killed a deer may hope to keep it for himself so long as
his cave is undiscovered; so long as he watches to defend it, and is stronger than his rivals;
but that is all . . . .Property and law are born together, and die together. Before laws
were made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases." J. BENTHAM, THE
THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112-13 (C. Ogden ed. 1931).
"Thus, the natural and proper relationship between man and property was said to be
communal ownership. See generally T. AQUINAS, SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS 169
(D'Entreves ed. 1959).
1' 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.40-.44 (A. Casner ed. 1952). A crucial factor
in our common law roots is often forgotten. The concept of "public" or "common" enter-
prises left many property owners restricted in their use of that property. See generally
Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Puhlic Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REv. 411, 418-28
(1927). When a business held itself out as a provider of certain products or services,
[t)he common law attached to these enterprises 'certain obligations, includ-
ing-at various stages of doctrinal development-the duty to serve all cus-
tomers on reasonable terms without discrimination and the duty to provide
the kind of product or service reasonably to be expected from their economic
role. Such occupations as blacksmith, food seller, veterinarian, and tailor, as
well as those of common carrier and innkeeper were probably included in
that category.'
In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 996, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 28 (1970), quoting To-
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separation of ownership, with title in the state and use in the citizens." Histori-
cally, the notion of holding property absolutely is also rebutted by nuisance
laws, zoning, rent control, public health laws, the power of eminent domain,
and conservation restrictions. 8 The general sacredness and inviolability of
American property rights are, therefore, something of a puzzle. One commenta-
tor attributes this "absolutism""9 to early American perversion of Lockeian
philosophy to accommodate the emerging concepts of capitalism and individ-
ualism." The concept that man acquired absolute natural rights in his property
because his labor blended into the property ' was naturally welcome in a
frontier society. Thus, property rights were thought to be sacrosanct and
"antecedent to the state."'" Private property absolutism has produced unequivo-
cal judicial dogma.
'So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property that it will not
authorize the least violation of it; no not even for the general good of the
whole community .... Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially
interested than in the protection of every individual's private rights ... '
[T]here are some absolute private rights beyond [the popular majority's]
reach and among these the constitution places the right of property."
The inflexibility of such a stance in light of pressing societal needs is obvi-
ously intolerable. The crowding and destruction of the commons is directly
proportionate to the necessity of increasing the restrictions on use. The same
applies to private property restrictions when societal demands exceed the in-
dividual utility. To determine which interest shall prevail or what compromise
may be reached, a realistic look must be taken at the actual impact upon the
conflicting claims.' The interpretations and definitions by the courts of these
briner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New Industrial
State, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1250 (1967). For a treatment of the public enterprise con-
cept as it applies to service stations, see Note, Service Without a Smile: Proprietors of Gas
Stations Must Serve Without Discrimination, 25 Sw. L.J. 651 (1971).
"
t This concept exists today. 1 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 626 (1969) (hereinafter
cited as POWELL).
"16 POWELL 72-158. See also Cross, The Diminishing Fee, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD.
517 (1955).
" "Absolutism" is used to mean unhampered use of private property.
"
0 Hecht, From Seisin to Sit-In: Evolving Property Concepts, 44 B.U.L. REV. 435, 456
(1964).
212 J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 129-41 (Everyman's ed. 1955).
" Hecht, supra note 20, at 456. The fallacy of the absolutist position is that Locke dis-
tinguished between man in a state of nature and man under a social compact. Once a gov-
ernment was formed Locke took a relativistic stance between property ownership, use, and
societal welfare. Id. at 457. "Relativism" is used to describe the equilibrium and interaction
between personal and property rights as it relates to societal and private utility.
"Wynehamer v. The People, 13 N.Y. 378, 386-87 (1856), quoting 1 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *139. But see State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971),
in which Chief Judge Weintraub ignored the defendants' constitutional arguments and
granted relief under a common law approach of relativism in property rights. The court
limited the rights of a farmer in maintaining his privacy; welfare workers were permitted
on the land to counsel and aid migrant workers. See also note 24 infra.
4An excellent example of a court's stripping away labels to examine the actual interests
at stake is seen in State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971). The decision necessi-
tated a balance between the landowners' property rights and the well-documented need for
protection of certain human values. While the implications of this case are far-reaching,
its authority is limited in the area of quasi-public property and shopping centers. The court
did not deal with first amendment freedoms and made it clear that there was no duty im-
posed on the landowner to open his premises to the general public. His ability to regulate
entry upon his land was simply nonabsolute. 277 A.2d at 374. See Note, 46 N.Y.U.L.
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interests reveal an affinity for relativism within the confines of the Constitu-
tion.' It should be remembered that the Constitution specifically protects
property rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments, as well as freedom
of expression under the first and fourteenth amendments.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIVISM IN PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
The first and fourteenth amendments protect persons from the deprivation of
the freedoms of speech, association, press, religion, and assembly by the state
or federal government." It is axiomatic that the Constitution was designed
primarily to protect individuals not from each other, but from the Govern-
ment. While the first amendment prohibits only Congress from abridging
free speech, the fourteenth amendment has been construed to impose the same
restriction on state governments. 7 In order to regulate private action that in-
hibits the exercise of certain rights and freedoms, the courts have developed
theories to associate "state action" with private conduct. 8 For the purpose of
examining the shopping center issues, the most important doctrine is that of
"public function.""
To invoke the doctrine there must exist a private entity which assumes and
operates a facility that would ordinarily be maintained by a governmental
entity. The action of the private entity is thus considered state action for
fourteenth amendment analysis. Private operators of such things as bridges,
ferries, turnpikes, and railroads have traditionally been viewed as public
functions and subject to state regulation."0 An analogy can be drawn to agency
law; a contractor cannot limit his liability by interposing an independent sub-
contractor to handle the high risk functions. By the same token, if a state is
constitutionally limited within one of its ordinary spheres of public activity,
it may not circumvent that limitation by delegating the function to a private
concern. An obvious example of this was revealed when primary elections
were delegated to private political parties with the resulting disenfranchise-
ment of black voters.32
REV. 834 (1971); Note, Granting Poverty Workers Access to Farmworkers Housed on
Private Property, 25 Sw. L.J. 780 (1971).
" See generally Friedman, Property, Freedom, Security and The Supreme Court of the
United States, 19 MODERN L. REV. 461 (1956).
26 For a review of first amendment judicial history, see Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268, 271 (1951).
27Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). For a full judicial treatment of the "in-
corporation" doctrine, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
2Black, "State Action," Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 69 (1968); Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083
(1960); Developments in the La--Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
" Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). This is not to say that there are no other
constitutional theories which are relevant. See note 28 supra.
"
0American Toll Bridge Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 307 U.S. 486 (1939); Clark's Ferry
Bridge Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 291 U.S. 227 (1934); Norfolk & S. Turnpike Co. v.
Virginia, 225 U.S. 264 (1912); Township of Pine Grove v. Tolcott, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
666 (1873).
3
1 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 71 (4th ed. 1971).
"sTerry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). "This grant [of voting) . . . is not to be
nullified by a state through casting its electoral process in a form which permits a private
organization to practice racial discrimination in the election. Constitutional rights would
be of little value if they could be thus indirectly denied." Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
664 (1944) [overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)); cf. Evans v. Newton,
[Vol. 26
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The beginning of any analysis of property rights in relation to "public
function" is Marsh v. Alabama." A member of Jehovah's Witnesses used a
sidewalk in the business block of a company town' to distribute religious
literature. The Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Justice Black writing
for the Court, reversed a trespass conviction' and concluded that the town,
while privately owned, had assumed a role generally performed by the public
sector. "Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an
owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in gen-
eral, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and consti-
tutional rights of those who use it."3
The Court, in Marsh, also struck a telling blow for the concept of relativism
by espousing a balancing approach between proprietary and individual rights.
In an analysis seemingly independent of the public function concept, the
Court acknowledged the actual impact of allowing first amendment rights to
be circumscribed!7 and concluded:
When we balance the constitutional rights of owners of property against those
of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, .... we must remain mind-
ful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position. " As we have stated
before, the right to exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment
'lies at the foundation of free government by free men'39 and we must in all
cases 'weigh the circumstances and . . . appraise the ... reasons ... in support
of the regulation ... of the rights .... ." In our view the circumstance that the
property rights to the premises where the deprivation of liberty ... took place,
were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to justify the State's per-
mitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their
fundamental liberties . . ..
This language indicates a more flexible approach than the standard state
action-public function criteria. Without specifically breaking any new legal
ground, the Court nevertheless intimated that it would consider all of the
382 U.S. 296 (1966). For a discussion of the public function concept, see United States v.
Wiseman, 445 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1971); Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tri-
bune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971).
33326 U.S. 501 (1946); accord, Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946) (decided the
same day).
'The town, known as Chickasaw, was a suburb of Mobile, Alabama, and was completely
owned by Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. The court referred to the business block as the
"regular shopping center." 326 U.S. at 503.
'Trespass laws are a common factor in quasi-public property decisions since the owners
of the "private" property complain of an unauthorized entry upon their property without
invitation which results in an interference with possession. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 5 13
(4th ed. 1971). Certain ordinances which can be viewed as trespass laws have been struck
down as restrictive of constitutionally protected conduct. The distribution of literature on
private residential property has generally been safeguarded against state interference. See,
e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939). But see Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
3 326 U.S. at 506.
" The Court cited numerous studies indicating the number of individuals whose first
amendment freedoms would be so affected. Id. at 508 n.5.
8The Court footnoted the following cases: Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 577
(1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S.
584, 608 (1942).
"
9 The Court cited Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
4 Id.
1 326 U.S. at 509.
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variables before allowing a restriction upon such important freedoms as those
contained in the first amendment.
A. Quasi-Public Property
"Quasi-public" is a label which is attached to property when that private
property is intentionally made accessible to the general public.' This transfor-
mation of private property means that the proprietary interests must be modi-
fied to accommodate first amendment freedoms.'
The concept of quasi-public property came into existence with Marsh. How-
ever, the precursors to that decision involved picketing on public property."
The landmark case of Thornhill v. Alabama held that the dissemination of
information in the form of peaceful picketing was protected by the first amend-
ment. In that case the parties concerned were employees; however, in a later
case the protection was extended to include nonemployees (i.e., labor organi-
zers).
The Court has steadfastly upheld the right of peaceful dissemination of
ideas in public places."' This is not to say that there are no limitations on such
activity.4 Generally, however, the Court has upheld the traditional notion that
" Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Local 444, 16 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d
876 (1962); State v. Williams, 44 LR.R.M. 2357 (Baltimore, Md., Crim. Ct. 1959).
43" [T)he private property . . . has taken on the nature of a quasi-public place. By
opening it to the public, the owner's property rights have become secondary to broad use
by the public, which includes the right of . . . peaceful picketing." State v. Williams, 44
L.R.R.M. 2357, 2360 (Baltimore, Md., Crim. Ct. 1959). See also In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.
2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967) (freedom of expression was upheld in a
privately-owned train station). Contra, Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 339, 99 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948) (apart-
ment building corridors); McLeod v. College of Artesia, 312 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.M. 1970)
(private college campus); Chumley v. Santa Anita Consol., Inc., 15 Cal. App. 3d 452, 93
Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971) (race track).
'"Picketing has gone from the extremes of being illegal per se to being protected first
amendment conduct. See generally Samoff, Picketing and the First Amendment: "Full Cir-
cle" and "Formal Surrender," 9 LAB. L.J. 889 (1958).
45310 U.S. 88 (1940); accord, Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940). See also
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). The Thornhill Court gave picketing full first amend-
ment protection which could only be limited by a clear and present danger. Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). However, in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,
336 U.S. 490 (1949), state regulation of picketing was examined under a reasonableness
test as being economic regulation. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284 (1957).
"AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941) (the picketing was aimed at employees, how-
ever). See also Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943); Bakery
Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942) (cases upholding the constitutional
protection of picketing).
"'See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) (public sidewalks);
Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940) (public highways); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939) (public streets). This was not always the case. See Davis v. Massachu-
setts, 167 U.S. 43 (1897).4 8See, e.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (picketing done in an ob-
structing manner); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (demonstration near a jail);
Plumbers Local 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953) (picketing against state right-to-work
law); Teamsters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) (picketing to the detriment
of small business); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (picketing
to bring about violation of antitrust law). Since picketing involves conduct as well as
speech, it has been found to be subject to controls not otherwise permissible in the case
of pure free speech. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 559 (1957); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
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public places are the natural and logical locations for the communication and
dissemination of ideas in a free society."
When picketing is done on property which is privately owned, the problem
goes deeper than modified free speech considerations. The proprietary rights
present serious countervailing obstacles to the otherwise protected conduct."0
In the field of labor law, employees have certain statutory organizational rights
on their employer's private property." The developments for nonemployees,
therefore, have more constitutional interest. The Supreme Court, in NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 2 took the position that an employer could exclude
nonemployee union activity under dual criteria: (1) the availability of other
adequate channels of communication; and (2) the nondiscriminatory manner
in which the employer grants access."
The first court to apply the Marsh concept of quasi-public property to the
nonemployee situation was the Seventh Circuit in Marshall Field & Co. v.
NLRB. 4 In that case it was held that nonemployees could be excluded from
inside the employer's building," but not from a walkway which evidently had
been transformed into quasi-public property by its similarity to a public street.
However, the quasi-public property concept was more fully enunciated and
developed in a series of shopping center cases.
B. Shopping Center Cases Prior to Logan Valley
The confusion in the courts " preceeding Amalgamated Food Employees
Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,"7 was attributable to the lack of defi-
nition of the dual aspects of Marsh (i.e., the use or characteristics of a public
function and the balancing of equities and rights). One aspect of that decision
which received continued attention was the property law doctrine of dedica-
tion.5" When a fee extends to the middle of a street, for example, part of that
49Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1940).
oSee generally Gould, Union Organizational Rights and The Concept of "Quasi-Public"
Property, 49 MINN. L. REv. 505 (1965).
" Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. S 157 (1970). Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 28
(1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944).
52351 U.S. 105 (1956) (involving a parking lot which was not open to the general
public). For a case distinguishing Babcock and finding a quasi-public parking lot, see Cen-
tral Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 1321 (8th Cir. 1971).
"This dual criteria draws no distinction between private and quasi-public property.
Babcock is due for further consideration according to a recent Supreme Court decision which
held inapplicable the rationale of Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (see text accompanying note 72 infra). Central Hardware
Co. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 1321, vacated and remanded, 92 S. Ct. 2238, 2243 (1972).
"200 F.2d 375 (7th Cit. 1953). It should be remembered that the term "quasi-public"
is merely a convenient expression for describing property which has been opened to the
general public. Whether it implies that a public function has been assumed is unclear.
" This squares with the later Babcock decision. See note 52 supra, and accompanying
text.5e A contributing factor to the confusion is the "pre-emption doctrine" which denies
state court jurisdiction. "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [National
Labor Relations] Act, the states as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive
competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with
national policy is to be averted." San Diego Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245
(1959). See also People v. Goduto, 21 II1. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 927 (1961); International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961);
Gould, supra note 50, at 532.
5"391 U.S. 308 (1968).
"Notice that Justice Frankfurter, in Marsh, treats this as immaterial to the Bill of
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property may be dedicated to full public use.59 "Private property may, by un-
ceremonious act and implication . . . on the part of the landowner, and like
act and implication . . . on the part of the public, become subject to public
easement by means of common law dedication.""
The following cases illustrate various state court developments prior to
Logan Valley Plaza.1 In Hood v. Stafford" a nonemployee's trespass conviction
was upheld. The court limited its inquiry to the physical characteristics of a
small grocery store and found no public dedication. The owner's invitation
was said not to extend to the general public but only to those who would
benefit the business. 3 Another trespass conviction was upheld in South Discount
Foods, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 1552"4 because not only was no invita-
tion extended to the general public (only to customers), but private
property could not be deemed to be public merely because it resembled a
public facility. At the opposite extreme is Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Em-
ployees Local 444,"5 in which the court was content to dismiss for lack of
evidence by looking only to physical characteristics of the shopping center
sidewalks. These cases indicate an emphasis on the physical construction of
the property in question and a disregard for the relativism or balancing of
equities, which was promoted by the Court in Marsh."
A case illustrating the nationwide split of opinion was Amalgamated Cloth-
ing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center,"' in which half the Michigan Su-
preme Court viewed the shopping center as the functional equivalent of a
public market and hence dedicated to public use. 8 The other half of the court
could find no governmental function because a shopping center was "not a
town in any sense of the term. It performs no governmental functions ... .""
These illustrative cases show the danger in the creation of a term such as
"quasi-public." Very few courts have stripped away the labels and physical
Rights and preferred freedoms question. 326 U.S. at 510-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
59 See, e.g., Vonderschmitt v. McGuire, 100 Ind. App. 632, 195 N.E. 585 (1935);
26 C.J.S. Dedication §§ 13-25 (1956). See also Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951). "[I]n neither case [Marsh and its companion case, Tucker v. Texas) was there
dedication to public use, but it seems fair to say that the permissive use of the ways was
considered the equivalent to such dedication." Id. at 643. Union Transportation Co. v.
Sacramento Co., 42 Cal. 2d 235, 267 P.2d 10, 42 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1954) (public dedica-
tion does not'have to be explicit); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968) (state involvement such that freedom of
expression was protected was found through a dedicated public use of a bus terminal). See
Note, Forced Dedications as a Condition to Subdivision Approval, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
112 (1972).
' Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Wonderland Shopping Center, Inc., 370 Mich.
547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963).
01 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
62213 Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964).
6See note 35 supra. See also People v. Goduto, 21 Ill. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385, cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961) (similar holding involving a Sears, Roebuck parking lot).
4 14 Ohio Misc. 188, 235 N.E.2d 143 (1968). The Ohio court specifically found no
public dedication. 235 N.E.2d at 147. "The court also finds that a general invitation to
certain classes of persons to use the premises and the exclusion of certain other classes of
persons is fully consistent with the right of a property owner to the use and enjoyment of
his property." Id.6 516 Wis. 2d 499, 114 N.W.2d 876 (1962).
66See note 41 supra, and accompanying text.
67370 Mich. 547, 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963) (decision affirmed by an evenly split court).
, See text accompanying note 60 supra.
69 122 N.W.2d at 788-89.
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characteristics to view the realities of the interests at hand.* The desire and need
for clarification prior to Logan Valley was manifest. "In this complex and dy-
namic society no legal code, no aggregate of statutory directions and judge-
made precedents have as yet furnished explicit and unambiguous commands for
the determination of this question.""
C. Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.
Logan Valley"' has been criticized for further muddying the water with re-
spect to the dichotomy between free speech and property interests."' The de-
cision might have had the effect of expanding, as well as contracting, Marsh.'4
The case involved picketing in a supermarket parcel pickup area. The Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court affirmed an injunction finding the union's activity a
trespass. ' The Supreme Court reversed.' It was held that the center was the
functional equivalent of a business block, and as such the state could not
delegate the power to silence first amendment freedoms through use of its
trespass laws." After finding striking similarities to the company town in
Marsh, however, the Court declined to extend the full free speech protection of
that decision. The protection went only to use-related activity.'
70 Two decisions which attempted to apply the balancing approach as well as the public
function aspect of Marsh are Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers Local 31,
61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906
(1965), and Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union, 58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961).
In Schwartz-Torrance the court considered alternative forums for the picketing and
found them ineffectual and dangerous because of traffic conditions. It considered the
plaintiff's claims for exclusive possession and enjoyment of private property and found them
largely theoretical (approximately 10,000 people visited the premises weekly). The court
then agreed with the affirming decision in Amalgamated Clothing Workers and found that
the shopping center had acquired a quasi-public character. "The interest of the union thus
rests upon the solid substance of public policy and constitutional right; the interest of the
plaintiff lies in the shadow cast by a property right worn thin by public usage." 394 P.2d
at 926, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
In Freeman the court held that a trespass question was pre-empted (note 56 supra)
by the NLRA. However, a concurring opinion endorsed five factors enunciated by the trial
judge for the purpose of balancing the interests. Free speech on private property should
be allowed when all or some of the following are present: (1) the private property is
designed for the general public in such a way that the physical characteristics are hard to
distinguish from public property; (2) the exercise of free speech is to communicate with
people naturally on the property as a result of the primary use of the property; (3) the
communication would be allowed if made on public property; (4) there is no interference
with the owner's fundamental rights of privacy or personal use, and no direct pecuniary
loss; (5) there are no effective alternative places for communication. 363 P.2d at 806.
7 South Discount Foods, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 1552, 14 Ohio Misc. 188, 192, 235
N.E.2d 143, 146 (1968).
72 Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968).
73 Forkosch, Picketing in Shopping Centers, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 250 (1969).
74 Marsh was expanded to include areas other than company towns, overruling prior de-
cisions which had limited Marsh to those facts. See, e.g., notes 62, 64, 69 supra, and ac-
companying text, as well as 391 U.S. at 331 (Black, J., dissenting). Logan Valley may
have meant to limit Marsh to cases of free speech in which there is a use relationship to a
target store. 391 U.S. 319-20. Marsh had no such restriction. See note 78 infra.
75425 Pa. 382, 227 A.2d 874 (1967).
70391 U.S. at 309.
"Id. at 319.
78 Logan Valley, therefore, protects only those members of the public wishing to exercise
"first amendment rights on the premises in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant
with the use to which the property is actually put." Id. at 319-20. In a footnote the Court
declined to consider "whether respondent's property rights could, consistently with the first
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The significance of Logan Valley lies in the balancing approach used and
the compromise struck to accommodate both proprietary and free speech
rights. Justice Douglas spoke of degrees of dedication to public use." He would
require a different level of relativism if the Court were to find that the center
had been fully dedicated to public use."0 The decision was in reality based on
a balance of the following factors: ( 1 ) the petitioners' placards could not have
been deciphered from the distance required by the state court injunction;8'
(2) the speed of traffic and the hazard of handbilling on a heavily traveled
road posed an unacceptable risk;' (3) the requirement of picketing outside the
shopping center would have made it difficult to limit the effect of the picket-
ing;" (4) the economic realities of a shift of the population to the suburbs
had caused a consequent increase in the use of shopping centers "as a way of
life;" 4 (5) the creation of a cordon sanitaire of parking lots around suburban
stores would have promoted an inequitable double standard for downtown
stores;' and (6) the means to challenge conditions and merchandise in sub-
urban stores would have been unavailable.
Logan Valley took an incremental balancing approach and allowed the pe-
titioners to use free speech in pursuit of a legitimate end, consonant with the
use of the property owners. The issue of providing a public forum on private
property for first amendment activity unrelated to the businesses was not before
the Court.8" There was no need to whittle away property rights which have
no small measure of constitutional protection through the fifth amendment."
The compromise was well stated by Justice Douglas: "[The proprietors] hold
out the mall as 'public' for purposes of attracting customers .... Why should
respondents be permitted to avoid this incidence of carrying on a public busi-
ness in the name of 'private property'? '""
III. THE AFTERMATH: SOAPBOXES IN THE SHOPPING CENTER
The courts continued to grapple with the problem of quasi-public property."
However, few cases came to grips with the unanswered questions left by Logan
amendment, justify a bar on picketing which was not thus directly related in its purpose to
the use to which the shopping center property was being put." This is what is meant by
use-related free speech activity. Id. at 320 n.9. See also note 74 supra.
" Id. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring).
" The property would be treated as any other public property in relation to the exercise
of free speech. Hence, the only limitations would be those recognized on all such activity.
See note 48 supra, and accompanying text. But the Court did recognize, as a general propo-
sition, that a person may not voluntarily open his property to the public for commercial




83 Id. at 323. Petitioners cited the danger of an illegal secondary boycott in regard to
common situs picketing. See Electrical Workers Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961).
391 U.S. at 324. The court cited statistical studies in support of this factor.
85 1d. at 324-25.
88 See note 78 supra.
87Id. at 330 (Black, J., dissenting).
88Id. at 326 (Douglas, J., concurring).
8Two cases involving college campuses which held to the general idea that a private
entity operating in a public fashion may not assert titled property rights to deprive con-
stitutionally protected rights are Robinson v. Davis, 447 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1971), and
Jones v. Board of Regents, 436 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1970). See also Chumley v. Santa Anita
Consol., Inc., 15 Cal. App. 3d 452, 93 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971).
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Valley. That case left no doubts about the validity of free speech activity when
it directly related to a target business. The question remained whether the
shopping center could be turned into a public forum to accommodate the free
flow of communication when that activity has nothing to do with the business
conducted in the center.
The first case to deal with the exact question which Logan Valley left un-
answered was State v.. Miller." In a decision based on what can best be charac-
terized as blind faith, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a trespass con-
viction of persons distributing political campaign pamphlets which apparently
had no relation whatsoever to the business in the center. The substance of the
per curiam opinion was, "The decision [Logan Valley) is controlling over the
facts involved in the case now before us. On the basis thereof, the convictions
must be reversed."' 1 It is safe to assume that a better reasoned explanation
would have been necessary to convince the Supreme Court that Logan Valley
was controlling.'"
An Oregon federal district court gave the first substantial" holding dealing
with the use-relationship issue in Tanner v. Lloyd Corp. The court actually
based its decision on Marsh and Wolin v. Port of New York Authority" in
protecting a draft resistance group's right to handbill in a shopping center.
Unlike Miller," the court recognized the distinction between Logan Valley and
Marsh but chose the broader rule in Marsh to protect all the typical free speech
rights and not just those which sought to cure a commercial ill within the
shopping center. In reaching this decision the court balanced the equities and
reasoned that otherwise "the public need for uncensored information, on which
Marsh was based, could be frustrated.""' The court apparently concluded that
"280 Minn. 566, 159 N.W.2d 895 (1968).
" 159 N.W.2d at 896.Logan Valley did not decide these facts. See note 78 supra, and accompanying text;
cf. Tanner v. Lloyd Corp., 92 S. Ct. 2219 (1972).
"Two earlier cases greeted Logan Valley with disapproval and reluctant acceptance.
Broadmoor Plaza, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 21 Ohio Misc. 245, 257 N.E.2d 420
(1969); Blue Ridge Shopping Center, Inc. v. Scheininger, 432 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. App.-
Kansas City 1968). Both of these cases had fact situations which satisfied the use-relationship
criteria of Logan Valley. In Blue Ridge handbilling in the shopping center was sanctioned
on the strength of a quotation from Marsh describing quasi-public property which also
appeared in Logan Valley. See text accompanying note 36 supra. In Broadmoor Plaza the
court overruled South Discount Foods (note 64 supra, and accompanying text) in finding
NLRB jurisdiction. Because of the fact similarities to Logan Valley, these cases break no
new legal ground and are significant only because they reveal express state level disapproval
of the lack of protection afforded private property in Logan Valley. See 432 S.W.2d at 616;
257 N.E.2d at 423. See also In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1969) (single grocery store decision following Logan Valley).
"308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Ore. 1970), afI'd, 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 92
S. Ct. 2219 (1972). The Supreme Court decision in Tanner will be discussed in detail
in section IV infra.
9' Wolin protected freedom of expression without a use-nexus in a bus terminal which
was found to be dedicated to a public use. 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
940 (1968).
"280 Minn. 566, 159 N.W.2d 895 (1968).
' 308 F. Supp. at 132. Pertinent factors in the decision were as follows: (1) hand-
billing from the public sidewalks outside the mall would be less effective and perhaps dan-
gerous; (2) there was no littering or disturbance; and (3) the shopping center's manage-
ment had previously allowed football rallies, Veterans' Day ceremonies, as well as American
Legion and Salvation Army activity (though it excluded the March of Dimes, Hadassah,
and Governor Tom McCall). The court also tried to distinguish handbilling as pure speech
from picketing as speech plus. Id. at 132. Contra, Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590
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free speech rights occupied a preferred position and "weighed heavier than the
[property] owners' rights.""
In Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, Inc.," the court found itself
faced with the Logan Valley limitation in the form of signature solicitation
for legislative certification of an ecology bill. The court acknowledged that
the use of shopping centers was the most effective way to obtain signatures.' °
Again, a balancing test was applied, and the court spoke of the "diminishing
fee"1" as being outweighed by the first amendment rights. An interesting aspect
of the case was not only a finding of quasi-public property as the functional
equivalent of a business block, but also a finding of "state action" because of
deputized security guards."'°
The use-relationship limitation was handled in a different manner from the
Tanner lower court treatment. While both courts noted the inconsistency, the
Sutherland decision was an attempt at reconciliation.' 4 A broad interpretation
was given to the Logan Valley use-relationship limitation. 0' Picketing was also
distinguished as being more objectionable than other free speech activity in
a shopping center.! " These were superficial twists" to Logan Valley which were
utilized to justify the real basis for the decision-the public nature of the
enterprise and the balancing of equities between first and fifth amendment
rights. 0"'
The Supreme Court of California has established a consistent line of cases
which provide the most thorough, albeit expansive, state court authority deal-
ing with Logan Valley and Marsh. In re Hoffman'' was a significant pre-
Logan Valley decision which protected handbilling in a privately-owned train
station. Recognizing the public function of the station, the court specifically
dispensed with the use-relationship idea"' and found that the first amendment
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
555 (1965). See also note 103 infra, and accompanying text.
" 308 F. Supp. at 132; see note 104 infra.
"'3 Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d 792 (1970).
"'0478 P.2d at 794, citing Saddler v. State, 66 Wash. 2d 215, 401 P.2d 848 (1965).
11 "The balancing of conflicting interests is basic to the achievement of justice as the
goal of law." 478 P.2d at 799, citing SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 63 (12th ed. P.J.
Fitzgerald 1966); Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1943);
Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1 & 2), 24 HARV. L.
REV. 591, 25 HARv. L. REV. 140 (1911).
'02 Cross, The Diminishing Fee, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 517 (1955).
101 For criticism of this concept see Note, Shopping Centers and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: Public Function and State Action, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 112 (1971).
'" The Tanner lower court primarily chose the reasoning of Marsh over Logan Valley.
It recognized that the latter might not be applicable. "If Logan Valley does not go as far as
I suggest, the first amendment does." 308 F. Supp. at 132. But cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
92 S. Ct. 2219 (1972).
105 The limitation was said to restrict activity which would "unreasonably interfere with
the normal use of the public of the retail functions of the shopping centers." 478 P.2d at
798.100 Id. at 799. Handbilling and signature collection must be viewed on equivalent terms
with respect to actual physical interference. Cf. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490 (1949).
"'The Logan Valley court was quite specific and clear in its limitation. 39.1 U.S. at
319-20.
10"See note 101 supra, and accompanying text.
10067 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
510 "In neither case can first amendment activities be prohibited solely because the prop-
erty involved is not maintained primarily as a forum for such activities . . . . [T)he test
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interest outweighed the interests in property and the functioning of a train
station.1 ' Reasonable regulation was possible to accommodate both interests."'
The facts of a second decision, In re Lane,"' satisfied the use-relationship cri-
teria (i.e., handbilling against a particular store). The case is significant only
because it stresses the pragmatic assertion of first amendment rights. While no
shopping center was involved, the court refused to allow even a single grocery
store to maintain a cordon sanitaire around itself."" In re Cox"' involved the
purest form of freedom of expression, that of appearance and association. "
The management of the shopping center arbitrarily excluded petitioner by
having him arrested for trespass, even though his only purpose was to make a
purchase. Using the common law characterization of "public enterprise,'..
the court gave a frank portrayal of the nature of the shopping center:
In undertaking to provide the necessities and amenities of life, the shopping
center performs an important public function. In some areas the public must
rely upon the shopping center as its sole source of food, clothing, and other
commodities.... Our modern society has become so interdependent and in-
terrelated that those who perform a significant public function may not erect
barriers of arbitrary discrimination ....
While the above cases did not deal with the specific problem of use-rela-
tionship left by Logan Valley, they served as supporting background for the
most significant state court decision on that issue. Diamond v. Bland... involved
signature solicitation and handbilling by an ecology group. The court took
portions of both Logan Valley and Marsh and connected the unrelated first
amendment protection given by Marsh to citizens in a private business district
with the Logan Valley parallel of a shopping center to such a district."' The
distinction in Logan Valley was rationalized as being particular to the facts
of that case. It was desirable to limit unrelated picketing in Logan Valley
Plaza, for example, because of its small size.'' The best treatment of the use-
is not whether petitioners' use of the station was a railway use but whether it interfered
with that use." 434 P.2d at 356, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 100.
"Id.
" 'Had petitioners in any way interfered with the conduct of the railroad business, they
could legitimately have been asked to leave." 434 P.2d at 357, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 101. "Per-
sons can be excluded entirely from areas where their presence would threaten personal dan-
get or block the flow of . . . traffic . 434 P.2d at 358, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
11371 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1969).
"'The nearest alternate forum was a public sidewalk some 280 feet away. 457 P.2d
at 564, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
"153 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970).
11 The petitioner was accompanied by a friend who wore long hair and unconventional
dress. 3 Cal. 3d at 210, 474 P.2d at 994, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 26.1173 Cal. 3d at 212, 474 P.2d at 996, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 28. See note 16 supra.
n13 Cal. 3d at 218, 474 P.2d at 1000, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 32. The court also stated: "The
shopping center may no more exclude individuals who wear long hair or unconventional
dress, who are black, who are members of the John Birch Society or who belong to the
American Civil Liberties Union, merely because of these characteristics or associations, than
may the city .... Id. For a case striking down a statute purporting to give private prop-
erty owners the arbitrary power to exclude anyone at the owners' whim, see Ames v. City
of Hermosa Beach, 16 Cal. App. 3d 146, 93 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1971).
"13 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988(1971).
1103 Cal. 3d at 660, 477 P.2d at 736, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
.. Inland Shopping Center, which was involved in Diamond, was the largest shopping
center in San Bernadino County. 3 Cal. 3d at 656, 477 P.2d at 734, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
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relationship limitation was a comparison with Schwartz-Torrance Investment
Corp. v. Bakery Workers Local 31," which was decided by the California
court four years prior to Logan Valley. The court acknowledged that both
cases balanced property interests against union interests; and the only relevance
of the use-relationship factor was its service as a strengthening factor on the
union's side."' Often the only truly effective place to call attention to a problem
is at the target business location. In the balancing process the property interest
is unaffected by whether or not the activity is related to a business use. Thus,
the true test turned on the relative unimportance of private property rights
when they are "worn thin by public usage."'24 The court also relied on the
specific language rejecting use-relationship in Hoffman"' and Wolin."2 The
broad holding was expressed as follows: "Unless there is obstruction of or un-
due interference with normal business operations, the bare title of the property
owners does not outweigh the substantial interest of individuals and groups
to engage in peaceful and orderly First Amendment activities on the premises
of shopping centers open to the public."'27
The recent state and lower federal court authority thus indicated that Logan
Valley was not a restriction of Marsh. The Supreme Court merely limited Lo-
gan Valley to its facts and never reached the public forum issue in finding a
shopping center the functional equivalent of a business district. However, the
courts seized upon this reasoning and then applied Marsh to permit unrelated
first amendment activity. This theory assumed the vitality of the state action-
public function concept when, in fact, those courts attached little emphasis
in that area. Some centers may indeed be the equivalent of modern business
municipalities, but Logan Valley did not say that all of them are. It became ap-
parent that state action was only a secondary consideration. The prime factors
were the nature of quasi-public property and the inequity of enforcing full pri-
vate property limitations to the detriment of vital first amendment freedoms.
IV. LLOYD CORP. V. TANNER
In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner"' the Supreme Court alleviated the confusion but
not the problem. In a 5-4 decision 2 ' the majority gave a narrow reading to
Marsh and Logan Valley and strictly limited them to their respective facts. In
Tanner the Court found no dedication of the shopping center property to a
public use. Under the Logan Valley limitation, the respondents in Tanner
12261 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964); see note 70 supra.
2223 Cal. 3d at 662, 477 P.2d at 738, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
3 Cal. 3d at 663, 477 P.2d at 739, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 507, quoting Schwartz-Torrance,
394 P.2d at 926, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 238. The court described the property interest as "naked
tide." 3 Cal. 3d at 663, 477 P.2d at 739, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
.2267 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
"'392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
'273 Cal. 3d at 666, 477 P.2d at 741, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 509 (emphasis added). A shop
owner might justifiably wonder if "premises" includes the area inside his store. Justice
White had the same concern in Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 339.
"' 92 S. Ct. 2219 (1972). For a discussion of the lower court decision, see note 94
supra, and accompanying text.
229 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, was joined by the three other Nixon appoint-
ees (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, Rehnquist, JJ.) and Justice White. Justice Marshall (the author
of Logan Valley) wrote a vigorous dissent and was joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Stew-
art, JJ. (all members of the Court when Logan Valley was decided).
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could not exercise First Amendment rights which were unrelated to the pe-
titioner's shopping center operations. The Court went further and found that
the shopping center was still private in character, notwithstanding the fact
that it was open to the public. After distinguishing Marsh and Logan Valley
on their facts, the Court was persuaded that the alternative means of communi-
cation available to the respondents justified protection of the petitioner's prop-
erty. In short, the Court totally rejected a growing body of state and lower
federal court law.
The Tanner"' decision reveals the continuing importance of American prop-
erty rights; even to the detriment of first amendment rights."' The majority
must be criticized on various aspects of the decision. First, Lloyd Center ex-
emplified a much stronger case for state action through the assumption of a
public function than did Logan Valley Plaza, which was held to be the func-
tional equivalent of a public business district." It should be remembered that
this concept relates only to the first of Marsh's dual criteria (public function
and balancing the equities)."' Lloyd Center covered some fifty acres of land
with more than sixty commercial businesses and professional offices. The com-
mercial and recreational facilities were extremely complete." Lloyd Center
employed guards who wore uniforms identical to other city police and who
were given full police power by the city. In various city ordinances the area
was referred to as a general retail business district which would require city
street and health planning." Free speech should not be limited under such a
situation except through reasonable regulation, especially in view of the follow-
ing Marsh language: "The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circum-
scribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."" Logan
Valley Plaza was considered to be a business district. Lloyd Center, by com-
parison, approached the proportions of a small city. The majority, rather than
dealing with this reality, merely said: "[T]here has been no such dedication of
Lloyd's privately owned and operated shopping center to public use .... 137
This language reveals a misunderstanding of the dedication concept."'
Second, the majority ignored Marsh's second criterion, the balancing of the
equities."' This aspect bears directly on the use-relationship criteria of Logan
Valley. That is, free speech activity was said to be protected if it was "generally
consonant with the use to which the property is actually put."'' It is true that
the Logan Valley Court reserved the question of indirect use-relationship.14'
However, in Tanner the relationship between the use to which Lloyd Center
" See also Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 92 S. Ct. 2238 (1972) (a companion case
dealing with the labor law aspects of Logan Valley).
.3 See text accompanying note 22 supra.
1"391 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1968).
... See text accompanying note 57 supra.
" 92 S. Ct. at 2221.
"'Id. at 2232 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1. 326 U.S. at 506.
92 S. Cc. at 2229.
".. See notes 59, 60 supra, and accompanying text.
"' See text accompanying note 41 supra.
'4'391 U.S. at 320.
'.. Id. at 320 n.9.
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was actually put and the use which was denied the respondents was quite im-
mediate. Lloyd Center in fact was used for selected first amendment activity.4 '
Lloyd Center permitted schools to hold rallies, presidential candidates to speak,
and the Salvation Army, the Volunteers of America, and the American Legion
to solicit funds. On Veteran's Day a parade was held and a speaker was allowed
to deliver an address about the "valor of American soldiers." '143 The American
Legion, a veteran's organization, was permitted to sell poppies in the Lloyd
Center.'" Respondent's antiwar leaflets invited the public "to attend a meeting
in which different points of view would be expressed than those held by the
organizations and persons privileged to use Lloyd Center as a forum for parad-
ing their ideas and symbols."" Respondent's free speech activity must be
viewed as "generally consonant" with the other free speech use of the shop-
ping center. The relationship though contradictory was direct. The Court's
non-recognition of this use-relationship opens the way to discriminatory prac-
tices in shopping centers. Hereafter, shopping centers can arbitrarily exclude
speakers with whom the management does not agree. If such power is available
in limiting the preferred freedom of free speech, may shopping centers now
exclude individuals whose hair length, dress, or religion is distasteful to manage-
ment?'"
Third, the Tanner majority did not give a realistic treatment of other equita-
ble factors. For example, the respondents were said to have an appropriate al-
ternative forum on the sidewalks approaching Lloyd Center's mall. The dis-
trict court and the court of appeals made careful findings of fact to the effect
that the reachable audience was not the same outside the mall. The quantity of
people was found to be less and the hardship in approaching those people was
found to be too great. The alternative operation was found to be hazardous to
respondents, pedestrians, and automobile passengers.""7 Logan Valley placed
emphasis on the accessibility and the size of the audience.' Furthermore, the
leaflet distribution was "quiet and orderly, and there was no littering."'" There
was no interference with the ordinary business carried on in the shopping cen-
ter. In Logan Valley the free speech activity was actually meant to have a
detrimental economic effect on one of the shopping center proprietors. It is
difficult to see why the latter should be upheld while the former is disallowed.
The Court also neglected to fully explore the impact on certain groups of
the pervasiveness of a shopping district like Lloyd Center.1 '
For many persons who do not have easy access to television, radio, the major
newspapers, and the other forms of mass media, the only way they can express
themselves to a broad range of citizens on issues of general public concern is
to picket, or to handbill, or to utilize other free or relatively inexpensive means
142 See note 97 supra.
143 92 S. Ct. at 2234 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1" "At times the proceeds from selling poppies were used to finance lobbying and other
activities directed at increasing the military capacity of the United States." Id. at n.3, citing
JONES, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEGION 330-32 (1946).
" 92 S. Ct. at 2234 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"'See note 118 supra.
147 92 S. Ct. at 2236 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"'391 U.S. at 322.
'4'92 S. Ct. at 2222.
"' See, e.g., text accompanying note 118 supra.
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of communication. The only hope that these people have to be able to com-
municate effectively is to be permitted to speak in those areas in which most
of their fellow citizens can be found. One such area is the business district
of a city or town or its functional equivalent. And this is why respondents
have a tremendous need to express themselves within Lloyd Center.15'
If speech by financially weak interests is to reach many citizens in certain
communities, it must do so through a shopping area like Lloyd Center.
V. THE EQUITABLE APPROACH VERSUS THE
LLOYD CORP. V. TANNER APPROACH
The Public Function Fallacy. In Diamond, as well as Sutherland, the courts
actually were not looking for a public function. If a private entity has not
assumed a governmental function, it should not be restricted by the constitu-
tional limitations on government action."2 Private abridgment of freedoms, as
well as discrimination, is not constitutionally prohibited."' None of the recent
pre-Tanner cases have used the language of "dedication to a public use" in
the same way as in the pre-Logan Valley cases." The sidewalks of an actual
town, although privately owned, are at least physically distinguishable from an
indoor mall between stores which are accessible from the outside. Is the latter
a state function, even when all non-shopping activity has been consistently
prohibited by the management?" 5 The fact that an area is open to the shopping
public makes it quasi-public; but it does not mean that a state function is
being performed." Theoretically, state action is the sine qua non for protecting
first amendment freedoms from private action. Realistically, the state and lower
federal courts imposed a balancing test, and state action, through the public
nature of a shopping center, had been merely assumed from Logan Valley."'
After Tanner a genuine inquiry must be made in relation to state action through
the private assumption of a public function. However, the Court cannot con-
sistently say that Logan Valley Plaza was the functional equivalent of a public
business district and Lloyd Center was not.
The True Variables. When quasi-public property is involved, traditional prop-
erty rights are modified. At one time, the claim that only prospective customers
have been invited on the property would not have sustained a trespass con-
viction. When property rights were worn thin by public usage, " ' the state and
lower federal court trend was to look to the realities of the situation. How
"'. 92 S. Ct. at 2234-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting).1.. See note 30 supra, and accompanying text.
" See generally authorities cited in note 28 supra.
... See note 59 supra, and accompanying text.
.. Cf. Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, 3 Wash.
App. 833, 478 P.2d 792 (1970). Contra, Tanner v. Lloyd, 308 F. Supp. 128 (D. Ore.
1970), afl'd, 446 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1971).
... But see Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center, Inc. v. Utah Power & Light Co., 440
F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1971), in which a shopping center was held to be subject to regulation
as a public utility if it supplied electricity to lessee merchants.
... Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d
921, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965).
" Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394
P.2d 921, 926, 40 Cal. Rptr. 233, 238 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965).
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much interference was there with the primary purpose of the shopping cen-
ter?"5 ' Was there an actual disruption or littering?' 9 Were there effective al-
ternative forums available?"'. Had the management gone beyond opening its
property to prospective shoppers and provided a forum for other selected first
amendment activity?'..
Superimposed on these factors was the equalizer of reasonable regulation by
the shopping center owners."' The management could prevent interference
with pedestrian flow,'" and limit the time, place, and number of participants
involved.' By giving the owner reasonable control, a compromise was struck
which required the owner to find a way to accommodate first amendment ac-
tivity. But by this accommodation it would also seem that the owner could
minimize all demonstrable economic detriment. ' " This proposition seems en-
tirely reasonable when viewed against the purpose for which the property is
opened to the public, i.e., financial gain.
Tanner strikes no such compromise. Apparently because the majority in
Tanner viewed. Lloyd Center's quasi-public property as more private than
public, first amendment freedoms are now simply subordinated to property
rights.
The Interference Inconsistency. The use-relationship criteria of Logan Valley
became a meaningless technicality in pre-Tanner cases. Property open to the
public is quasi-public and is held by a long line of cases to be susceptible to
picketing.'67 For the courts to exclude unrelated first amendment activity is to
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (Reed, J., dissenting). See also In re
Ball, 23 Cal. App. 3d 380, 100 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1972). In that recent case defendants
sought to conduct a signature solicitation at Disneyland. The court upheld a trespass con-
viction and refused to find overbroad or vague the following statutory language: "Entering
any lands . . . for the purpose of injuring any property or property rights or with the in-
tention of interfering with, obstructing, or injuring any lawful business or occupation
.... " CAL. PEN. CODE § 602(j) (1956). The court found it unnecessary to reach the
constitutional issue of the vagueness of "property rights" because the record showed that
the defendant was convicted for entering with the intention of interfering with the owner's
lawful business. That standard was thought to be sufficiently narrow. The interference,
which was said to distinguish the case from Diamond, was the diverting of a passenger
tram to another off-loading area. Perhaps the real distinction, which the court declined to
discuss, was the fact that a fee was required to gain admittance. This was also true in Chum-
ley v. Santa Anita Consol., Inc., 15 Cal. App. 3d 952, 93 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971).
'"Littering, of itself, has not been enough to preclude first amendment activity. See
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). See also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
1 The availability of alternative forums has not been favored recently because factually
the alternative forums were not nearly so effective as the ones chosen by those asserting
first amendment freedoms. In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872, 457 P.2d 561, 79 Cal. Rptr. 729
(1969); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967); Schwartz-
Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery Workers Local 31, 61 Cal. 2d 766, 394 P.2d 921, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 233 (1964).
..2 See note 97 supra, and accompanying text.
"'Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970); cf.
In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353, 64 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1967).
.."Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968).
"'Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970).
... This concept relates back to the Diamond treatment of the use-relationship restriction
(i.e., since a financial interest was affected on the property side of the balance, the use-
connection strengthened the first amendment side). This indicates the necessity of a lesser
first amendment weight (non-use related) when no financial interest is hurt by the first
amendment activity. See note 123 supra, and accompanying text.
117 See generally Samoff, supra note 44.
COMMENTS
deny the reality of the situation. Use-related picketing is actually meant to
cause interference with the enjoyment of property. It is meant to cause eco-
nomic harm to the target business. Why should this type of activity be pro-
tected if neutral and regulable exercise of free speech is disallowed? The latter
causes virtually no harm whatsoever to the property rights and promotes the
free and effective dissemination of ideas by those who cannot afford expensive
electronic medias. When a business opens itself up to the public, it also sub-
jects itself to the possibility of public criticism as a risk of doing business.
While this criticism may be made elsewhere, labor experts are quick to point
out that the businessman's property is the most effective place to communicate
ideas.16' The same holds true for the public forum concept."0 ' The forum is
neither effective nor appropriate without the public.''
The Tanner majority has perpetuated the paradox of allowing the greater
private property intrusion (i.e., demonstrating against a target store) while
disallowing the lesser intrusion (i.e., peaceful non-use related activity). The
Court compounded this paradox in Tanner because the respondents' activity
was in fact related to a use to which Lloyd Center had already been put (other
select first amendment activities).''
VI. CONCLUSION
The shopping center industry was moving toward acceptance, pragmatic
accommodation, and self-regulation of public forum activity.' Nevertheless,
the courts and litigants did need the guidance in this area'. which Tanner
supplied.
Of the 12,000 new centers to be built in the next fifteen years,'" at least
1,000 will be covered malls.' These complex mall designs could present
challenging factual problems to the judiciary.' 0 Indeed, many of the shopping
developments could easily be classified as the new American City. " The Tanner
".. See Gould, supra note 50.
1"9 Cf. Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 940 (1968). The propriety of a place for use as a public forum was said to be
equally dependent upon either the object of the protest (target business) or where the
relevant audience could be found. 392 F.2d at 90.
"'See note 161 supra, and accompanying text. See also the incomparable audience avail-
able at the shopping center in Diamond (25,000 people per day). 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d
733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970).
... See text accompanying note 145 supra.
... One manager stated, "We set up rules for the center to be a community forum on
the theory that these troubles were not going to go away and we might as well control
them." 47 CHAIN STORE AGE, July 1971, at 27. Management now takes a $10 deposit to
cover damage or littering, and issues permits for a specific time and place on a first-come,
first-served basis. Id. "The question is not whether malls should be used as public forums;
they are being used that way. The point is how best we can accommodate them." Id.
(quoting Rouse Co. official, Ed Daniels).
'.. One recent litigant tried unsuccessfully to use Logan Valley to justify a "sit-in" in
a completely private building in protest of the inaccessibility of an audience with the Car-
dinal in the Archdiocese office. Chicago v. Rosser, 47 Ill. 2d 10, 264 N.E.2d 158 (1970).
17447 CHAIN STORE AGE, Feb. 1971, at 25.
"T' Weiss, supra note 3.
17647 CHAIN STORE AGE, Jan. 1971, at 32 (describing new "malls within malls" de-
signs).
17The shopping center developers now speak in terms of city planning with complete
integration of all functions of modern life. "Now, more and more they are becoming mini-
ature downtowns with three, four, five department stores, scores of smaller stores and
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decision indicates that such a city, along with the other conveniences, will have
programmed "free speech" in quantity and content.
The pre-Tanner courts were sacrificing constitutional structure with their
trend toward common-law balancing tests and public enterprise concepts.'
However, the equitable protection of free speech in relation to property rights
revealed an enlightened concern for those whose message might never effec-
tively reach the public. At the same time, the "reasonable regulation" factor
protected the property owners.
The theoretical absolutism of property rights has heretofore steadily given
way to social utility. The pre-Tanner inclination toward a quasi-public balan-
cing test in the area of shopping center forums is best summarized in theory
by Justice Cardozo:
Property, like liberty, though immune under the Constitution from destruction,
is not immune from regulation essential for the common good. What that
regulation shall be, every generation must work out for itself. The generation
which gave us Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) (upholding ceiling grain
storage charges in private storage bins), and like cases, asserted the right of
regulation whenever business was 'affected with a public use . .. .' Today there
is a growing tendency in political and juristic thought to probe the principle
more deeply and formulate it more broadly. Men are saying today that prop-
erty, like every other social institution has a social function to fulfill."7 9
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, however, reveals that in the United States social func-
tion is still secondary to property rights.
services, plus hotels, apartment houses, office buildings, cultural centers, churches, and
theaters." BUSINESS WEEK, Sept. 4, 1971, at 34. "New shopping centers will become more
integral parts of their surrounding infra-structure. Some of the larger centers are already
adding office parks to draw in light industry. Future centers may be focal points for new
'satellite cities' in metro areas. A case in point: the Northlake and Cumberland planned
community projects . ..will have two-level shopping centers surrounded by a mixture of
apartments and townhouses, office parks, and community halls." 105 SALES MANAGEMENT,
Nov. 1, 1970, at 34, 36.
" See notes 16, 23, 24 supra.
170B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 87-88 (1921).
(Vol. 26
